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THE INTERBELLUM CONSTITUTION:
FEDERALISM IN THE LONG FOUNDING MOMENT
Alison L. LaCroix*
Forthcoming, 67 Stanford Law Review (2015)
Today, the mechanism of the spending power drives the gears of
the modern federal machine. But early-nineteenth-century constitutional
debates demonstrate that the spending power is essentially a workaround,
and a recent one at that – a tool by which Congress achieves certain
political and legal ends while respecting the formal boundaries set by
Article I and the Tenth Amendment. This “interbellum” period was
enormously significant for American constitutional law, in particular the
constellation of related doctrines concerning congressional power that we
now place under the general heading of “federalism”: the spending power,
the enumerated powers of Article I, and the anticommandeering principle
of the Tenth Amendment. Political and legal actors in the early nineteenth
century believed themselves to be living in what this Article argues was a
long founding moment, in which the fundamental terms of the federal-state
relationship were still open to debate. Constitutional scholars have
mistakenly overlooked the constitutional creativity of the period. As a
normative matter, I argue for an approach to modern constitutional
interpretation that recognizes the ever-changing nature of the landscape
of constitutional permissibility, and that offers documentary evidence of
the precise contours of that change. Studying the evolution of the
spending power over time, especially where the text itself remains
constant, demonstrates that ideas about federal structure are not fixed.
Therefore, constitutional federalism itself is not fixed – a particularly
important insight in an area of constitutional doctrine that is dominated
by originalist approaches.
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THE INTERBELLUM CONSTITUTION:
FEDERALISM IN THE LONG FOUNDING MOMENT

Time and experience have verified to a demonstration, the
public utility of internal improvements. That the poorest
and most thinly populated countries would be greatly
benefitted by the opening of good roads, and in the clearing
of navigable streams within their limits, is what no person
will deny. . . . The only objection is to paying for them;
and the objection to paying arises from the want of ability
to pay.
– Abraham Lincoln, 18321
The constitutional landscape of the early nineteenth century,
roughly between the Revolution and the Civil War, was dramatically
different from that of the twenty-first, or even the twentieth, century.
Even in the realm of textual provisions that have not changed since the
1790s, such as Article I’s enumeration of Congress’s powers or the Tenth
Amendment’s reservation of powers to the states and the people, the
foundational assumptions – and the resulting worries and preoccupations –
of what this Article terms the “interbellum” period proceeded from
premises that must be understood as distinct and to some degree alien
from modern ones. The constitutional text is the same, but the modes of
interpretation that contemporaries used were different, as were the basic
questions they were asking the text to answer. The words of Article I and
the Tenth Amendment have not changed, but the surrounding universe of
constitutional possibility has.2
Given these differences, why are nineteenth-century constitutional
debates relevant to modern constitutional thought? Because the landscape
of constitutional possibility is perpetually changing, and the change in
each moment informs, and indeed shapes, the contours of the
constitutional landscape in the next moment. Yet still the landscape of
each remains distinct, and in some cases appears incompatible, when one
attempts to reconcile cases and doctrines across eras. Early-nineteenthcentury Americans exemplify this point. Their writings routinely
1

ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Appeal to the Voters of Sangamo County, Mar. 9, 1832, in THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 4 (Richard N. Current ed., 1967).
2
See Alison L. LaCroix, The Shadow Powers of Article I, 123 YALE LAW JOURNAL
(forthcoming, 2014) (discussing the structural and doctrinal significance for federalism of
changing theories of Congress’s powers under Article I).
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expressed both a sense of vigorous participation in the founding of the
Republic, and a gnawing worry that they had been born too late, and too
undistinguished, to wear that mantle comfortably. 3 They viewed
themselves as both a special cohort of energetic enactors of their forbears’
plans and a lesser generation of founders-manqués.4
This point is a historical one; it attempts to explain the actions and
motivations of historical actors. But concerns of historiography and
constitutional interpretation also offer important reasons to examine the
early nineteenth century. From a historiographical perspective, focusing
on the competing narratives that scholars have offered, the period is ripe
for reexamination. Many of the dominant accounts are several decades
old, or they pay insufficient attention to constitutional thought: the “age of
Jackson”; the “market revolution”; the “rise of American democracy”; the
“communications revolution.”5 These stories fail to recognize one of the
most significant markers of the era: the relentless focus of legal elites,
politicians, and ordinary people on the Constitution. This interbellum
period witnessed the emergence of the Constitution as the preeminent
organizing lens through which Americans viewed political and legal
questions.6 One reason for the period’s relative neglect in legal history is
the emphasis of constitutional law scholarship on the founding period and
Reconstruction, which has meant that the period between those watershed
events has not received due attention.
The early nineteenth century is thus enormously significant for
American constitutional law, in particular the constellation of related
doctrines concerning congressional power that we now place under the
general heading of “federalism”: the spending power and the
anticommandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment. 7 The period
3

See Alison L. LaCroix, The Lawyer’s Library in the Early American Republic, in
SUBVERSION AND SYMPATHY: GENDER, LAW, AND THE BRITISH NOVEL IN THE
EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES (Martha C. Nussbaum & Alison L. LaCroix
eds., 2013).
4
The paradigmatic example of the anxious inheritor, albeit from a few decades later, is
Henry Adams. See HENRY ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS (1918).
5
See, respectively, ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON (1945);
CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA, 1815-1848
(1991); SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN
(2006) DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT; ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR.,
THE VISIBLE HAND. But see Daniel Feller, “The Market Revolution Ate My Homework,”
25 REVS. IN AM. HIST. 408 (1997).
6
For a related point regarding the Civil War, see Arthur Bestor, “The American Civil
War as a Constitutional Crisis,” 69 AM. HIST. REV. 327 (1964).
7
On the reemergence of judicial federalism, see ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG
OF WAR WITHIN 97 (2012) (discussing the emergence of “New Federalism” theories,
“first as a political movement in the 1970s and 1980s, and then as the judicial revolution
of the 1990s.”); see also Neil A. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A
Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1648-50 (2006) (describing the benefits
of federalism); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L.
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between roughly 1815 and 1850 witnessed a series of sustained and
contentious public debates about the federal government’s power to fund
public works projects – “internal improvements,” in the parlance of the
day. These projects included roads, canals, harbors, lighthouses, and, later,
railroads.8 The central issue was the scope of Congress’s power vis-à-vis
the states in a federal system. Unlike recent challenges to federal
regulation that arguably interferes with state sovereignty,9 however, the
nineteenth-century controversy was not framed in terms of the states’
power to resist encroachments by Congress. Rather, the debate turned on
an entirely different conception of state sovereignty at the time of the
founding from the one employed in modern caselaw.
As I will demonstrate, the principal factors in much of the Court’s
modern federalism jurisprudence were largely absent from, or irrelevant to,
the debates over the practical meaning of federalism in the early
nineteenth century.10 The assumptions of unwaivable, monolithic state
sovereignty and perpetual, systemic federal-state tension that have
underpinned the majority opinions in many of the Court’s federalism cases
since the 1980s are difficult to trace to the founding period or the early
nineteenth century. As the controversy over internal improvements
illustrates, crucial interbellum constitutional debates about federalism
unfolded in the political branches: Congress, the presidency, and the state
legislatures. At issue was the scope of legislative power. Moreover, the
key themes included state consent; distinctions among Congress’s power
to appropriate funds for internal improvements, to execute the
improvements itself, and to transfer the public lands to the states for the
purposes of executing the improvements; and the role of the federal
government as proprietor of the public lands.

REV. 1, 51-63 (2004) (evaluating the Court’s treatment of “the values that motivate our
attachment to federalism in the first place”); Richard H. Fallon, The “Conservative”
Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002);
Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111
HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword:
We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001).
8
See JOHN LAURITZ LARSON, INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT (2001); CARTER GOODRICH,
GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF AMERICAN CANALS AND RAILROADS, 1800-1890 (1974);
GEORGE ROGERS TAYLOR, THE TRANSPORTATION REVOLUTION, 1815-1860; Carter
Goodrich, National Planning of Internal Improvements, 63 Poli. Sci. Q. 16 (1948).
9
See, e.g., National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992).
10
As I have argued elsewhere, federalism also had a distinctly different meaning in the
founding period from the meaning that is often ascribed to it today. See ALISON L.
LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 220-21 (2010) (arguing
that “the federal ideal” is “an intellectual artifact, not a transcendent or timeless idea that
has always hovered around waiting to be applied to a particular political project”).
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Today, the mechanism of the spending power drives the gears of
the modern federal machine.11 The internal improvements debates offer a
nineteenth-century lens on that power that highlights the differences
between interbellum and millennial constitutional thought. The internal
improvements controversy is thus both analogous and disanalogous to
modern debates on the practical implementation of federalism principles.
As I will show, interbellum constitutional thought was generally wary of
consolidated federal power over public works projects, preferring instead
to structure such projects as cooperative federal-state efforts. In contrast,
modern constitutional law doctrine often takes the opposite approach: the
federal government’s enumerated powers under Article I, where
appropriate, are the preferred structural route for such projects, and
indirect routes via state cooperation are disfavored.12 As an interpretive
matter, to the extent that modern caselaw relies on a particular substantive
concept of federalism that has been consistent since the founding, the
internal improvements example urges us to rethink that notion. Since the
earliest days of the Republic, federalism has been an unstable and
contested concept, worked out through the meshing of theory and
practice. 13 By highlighting nineteenth-century understandings of the
spending power, the internal improvements debate demonstrates the
dynamic nature of federalism in practice.
But this story is much more than a plea for recognizing
contingency or appreciating a path not taken. As a historical matter, I
contend that political and legal actors in the early nineteenth century
believed themselves to be living in what I term a “long founding moment,”
in which the fundamental terms of the federal-state relationship were still
open to debate. As a historiographical matter, I posit that scholars have
mistakenly overlooked the constitutional creativity of the period. As a
matter of constitutional interpretation, I argue for an approach that
recognizes the ever-changing nature of the landscape of constitutional
permissibility, and that offers documentary evidence of the precise
contours of that change.
The spending power, in both its interbellum and millennial
versions, is essentially a workaround – a tool by which Congress achieves
certain political and legal ends while respecting the formal boundaries set

11

See Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2012);
Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911
(1995); Thomas R. McCoy and Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism’s
Trojan Horse 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85; see also Ruth Mason, Federalism and the Taxing
Power, 99 CAL. L. REV. 975 (2011).
12
See, e.g., Pierce Co. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (2003); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
13
See Alison L. LaCroix, Rhetoric and Reality in Early American Legal History: A
Reply to Gordon Wood, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 733 (2011).
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by Article I and the Tenth Amendment.14 In keeping with the changing
nature of those boundaries as limned by the Court, the legislative
workaround also changes.15 Studying the changes to the workaround over
time, especially where the text itself remains constant, demonstrates that
ideas about federal structure are not fixed. Therefore, constitutional
federalism itself is not fixed. Comparing a particular doctrine across time
offers insight into the path of constitutional change by revealing what
arguments are, and what arguments are not, part of the Constitution at any
given moment.
I.

THE MODERN SPENDING POWER.

Imagine that a majority of representatives in Congress settles on a
plan to build a new national highway system. Some states already have
adequate roads that can be incorporated into the new system, but others
have decrepit highways that must be improved in order to allow the most
up-to-date cars – electric, perhaps, or self-driving. Those states’
legislatures are dominated by politicians who oppose federal funding for
state public works projects and who endorse a narrow view of
congressional power. These state politicians also worry that the expansion
of the electric/self-driving car industry will harm carmakers in their states.
A handful of these states express their intention to resist the federal
program. Undeterred, members of Congress insist that the cooperation of
all the states is necessary to achieve the goals of the new highway system.
But the congressional representatives would prefer not to inflame the
resisting states by issuing direct, and preemptive, federal legislation. May
Congress threaten to take away all federal highway funding from these
states if they do not undertake the necessary improvements? Not just new
highway funding for the new highway system, but all highway money?
To a degree rarely seen in constitutional law, the answer to this
question depends on when the question is asked. Prior to June 2012, the
answer would likely have been “yes.” The governing Supreme Court
precedent, South Dakota v. Dole,16 offered a clear answer: the Constitution
“empowers Congress to ‘lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States.’”17 As part of this spending power,
Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote, Congress “may attach conditions
14

See LaCroix, supra note __, at __ (Shadow Powers) (discussing the doctrinal and
structural relationships between Article I and the Tenth Amendment).
15
See generally Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499
(2009).
16
483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding federal legislation requiring states to raise the
minimum age for purchase or public possession of alcoholic beverages to 21 years or else
lose a percentage of otherwise allocable highway funds).
17
Id. at 206 (quoting U.S. CONST. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 1).
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on the receipt of federal funds” in order to “further broad policy
objectives.”18 The majority in Dole waved aside concerns about federal
coercion of the states that had underpinned analogous cases decades
earlier.19
After June 2012, however, the answer to the question of the scope
of Congress’s conditional spending power changed. The Court did not
overrule Dole, but it dramatically circumscribed the previously vast
domain in which the conditional spending power had been understood to
operate.20 In the health care case, National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, the Court invalidated the Medicaid provision of the
Affordable Care Act on the ground that it “penalize[d] States that choose
not to participate in that new program by taking away their existing
Medicaid funding.” 21 Reviving an early-twentieth-century strand of
doctrine, as well as invoking the “new federalist” decisions of the 1980s
and 1990s, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote, “Congress may use its
spending power to create incentives for States to act in accordance with
federal policies. But when pressure turns into compulsion, the legislation
runs contrary to our system of federalism.” 22 In short, the provision
amounted to “economic dragooning” insofar as it “threatened [the] loss of
over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget.”23 The Court thus returned
coercion to the center of the analysis of federal conditional spending
programs.
But one might reasonably ask whether a Court comprising several
originalist justices might be interested in the history of the spending power.
What was the nature of the power at a time closer to the founding, perhaps
nearly two hundred years ago, in 1822? Imagine asking a citizen of the
early Republic how Congress might permissibly go about building a
system of roads connecting the eastern seaboard with the interior states
carved out of the Northwest Territory, such as Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois.
Would Congress have the power to threaten to withhold funding for roads
if, for example, Ohio refused to build its roads using a designated sturdy
material, such as the new Scottish macadam technology, which mixed
small stones with cement?24 In other words, what textual and structural
tools did the federal government possess in 1822 to compel a state to act?
The citizen of 1822 would likely greet this question with a
quizzical expression. Yes, she responds, Congress certainly may withhold
18

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
See, e.g., id. at 209 (distinguishing prior cases).
20
See secondary sources re post-Dole scope of cond’l spending power.
21
567 U.S. __ (2012), No. 11-393 (slip op. at 55).
22
Id. (slip op. at 47) (quotation marks omitted).
23
Id. (slip op. at 52).
24
The first macadamized road in the United States was the Boonsboro Turnpike Road in
Maryland, completed in 1822.
19
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funding for the Ohio road. Then, she follows with a series of questions: is
the road in question located entirely within the state of Ohio? What were
the terms of the state of Ohio’s admission to the Union? What is the
source of the federal road funding – a tariff surplus, the general revenues,
some other source? Who owns the lands on which the Ohio road is to be
built – the federal government, the state, or private parties? Has Ohio
consented to the construction of the road?
These questions from the nineteenth-century observer would aim at
understanding not just the nature of the condition – the deal that Congress
is offering the state – but also the mechanism of the federal spending
program itself. A court in 1822 would likely have concluded that
Congress could indeed strip road funding from the states25 because it
would have questioned whether Congress could constitutionally grant
those monies to the state in the first place. To early-nineteenth-century
ears, the Ohio road hypothetical would conjure an entirely different set of
constitutional questions from the ones underlying modern spending-power
doctrine. The fear of economic dragooning, of commandeering the states
and rendering them little more than administrative districts, lies at the
heart of the spending power as it has developed since the early twentieth
century. “What can Congress compel the states to do?” is the animating
question for much of the Supreme Court’s modern federalism doctrine.
Between the Revolution and the Civil War, however, American legal and
political thought considered a different, less defensive question: “What
can Congress do in the name of the states?”
The spending power derives from the General Welfare Clause of
Article I, section 8, of the Constitution, which provides, “The Congress
shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to
pay the debts and provide for the general welfare of the United States.”26
Although the word “spend” does not appear in the clause, the orthodox
understanding of the clause is that it vests Congress with the power to tax,
and therefore to spend, for the general welfare of the United States. The
taxing and spending powers are thus conceptually and textually linked, but
the caselaw under each has diverged over the past several decades. Since
the 1930s, taxing power cases typically focus on federal taxation of
individuals, 27 while spending power cases tend to concern Congress’s

25

Assuming, of course, that the citizen of 1822 did not regard the offer of federal funds
as having created a vested right in the state. On vested rights theory in nineteenthcentury American legal thought, see Story’s Commentaries and Dartmouth College and
Fletcher v. Peck on vested rights.
26
U.S. CONST. Art. I, sec. 8.
27
See, e.g., NFIB, 567 U.S. at __ (upholding the individual mandate provision of the
Affordable Care Act under the taxing power); U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)
(invalidating tax on agricultural commodities under Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933
as beyond the scope of the “taxing and spending power”).
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authority to use federal funds to encourage states to adopt particular
programs or policies.28
From the ratification debates of the 1780s to the New Deal
controversies of the 1930s, the scope and structural relevance of the
General Welfare Clause were the subjects of extensive controversy. At
issue was how the clause fit into Article I’s architecture of enumerated
powers. Was its closest relative the Necessary and Proper Clause, which
operates as an auxiliary power to the enumerated powers and thus does not
give Congress an independent source of power to enact laws based only on
the claim that they are necessary and proper?29 This narrow view is
generally associated with James Madison, who held that the general
welfare power was not a freestanding power and therefore must be
attached to an enumerated power.30 Or was it more akin to one of those
enumerated powers, such that Congress could regulate based on a finding
that a particular policy aided the general welfare of the nation? This broad
view of the general welfare power as a freestanding power is attributed to
Alexander Hamilton, and the idea of it becoming the accepted
interpretation worried some observers at the ratification debates.31 An
intermediate position, offered by the constitutional law scholar Edward S.
Corwin, treats the general welfare power as “not an independent grant of
power, but a qualification of the taxing power.”32 On this view, the
general welfare power is limited to taxing and spending and does not
include broader types of regulation.
In U.S. v. Butler (1936),33 the Court adopted what it termed the
Hamiltonian view of the taxing and spending power (although the justices
ultimately invalidated the Butler tax as impermissibly close to regulation).
According to this theory, “the clause confers a power separate and distinct
from those later enumerated, is not restricted in meaning by the grant of
them, and Congress consequently has a substantive power to tax and
appropriate.”34 In other words, when Congress can plausibly characterize
a particular program as taxing or spending, it need not tie that program to
some other enumerated power.35
28

See, e.g., NFIB, 567 U.S. at __ (upholding in part and invalidating in part the ACA’s
expansion of state-run Medicaid programs); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548
(1937) (upholding Social Security Act’s scheme of encouraging employers to pay taxes
to state unemployment compensation fund).
29
U.S. CONST. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 18.
30
See James Madison to Martin Van Buren, Sept. 20, 1826.
31
See Pauline Maier, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION (2010).
32
See Edward S. Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress – Apropos the Maternity Act,
36 HARV. L. REV. 548, 552 (1923).
33
297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936).
34
Id.
35
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (adopting the four-part Steward
Machine test, according to which the exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of
the general welfare, the condition must be unambiguous, the condition must have some
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Following this ostensibly straightforward lineage, many scholars
interested in the origins of the spending power have looked to the New
Deal period, specifically the 1936 decision in Butler. 36 Others have
identified the internal improvements debates as the source of the spending
power, suggesting a more or less direct analogy between the earlynineteenth-century conception of the General Welfare Clause and that of
their own period.37
Because it structures the relationship between Congress and the
states, the spending power is connected to two other important areas of
doctrine: on one side, congressional power under the Commerce Clause38
and the Necessary and Proper Clause39; and on the other side, the limits
that the Tenth Amendment places on congressional power. Article I and
the Tenth Amendment,40 along with the Supremacy Clause, constitute the
few places in the Constitution’s text where we find reference to
federalism.41 The Tenth Amendment is typically viewed as a textual basis
for assertions of state sovereignty. As such, it becomes doctrinally
relevant in two situations. The first is the situation in which Congress
issues a general statute aimed at individuals pursuant to one of its
enumerated powers, and the Court then steps in to strike down the
legislation in the name of the states and their reserved powers.42 In the
second situation, Congress attempts to use its enumerated powers to
produce a specific action or policy from a state legislature or executive,
and the Court holds that Congress has gone too far – it has
“commandeered” the state government. 43 The Court’s holding in the
health care case that the Medicaid provision exceeded constitutional limits
and amounted to coercion renders the Tenth Amendment a meaningful

relation to the federal interest in a particular program, and the condition cannot violate
any other constitutional provision).
36
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89
(2001).
37
See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Constitutional Ambiguities and Originalism: Lessons From
the Spending Power, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 395 (2009); David E. Engdahl, The Spending
Power, 44 DUKE L. J. 1 (1994); Edward S. Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress –
Apropos the Maternity Act, 36 HARV. L. REV. 548 (1923).
38
U.S. CONST., Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3.
39
U.S. CONST., Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 18.
40
U.S. CONST., Amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.”).
41
See LaCroix, supra note __, at __ (Shadow Powers).
42
See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transportation Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
43
See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 528 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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limit on the spending power for the first time in decades.44 The debates
over internal improvements in the early nineteenth century combined
elements of all these doctrinal areas, in ways that are sometimes surprising
to modern observers.
II.

THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SPENDING POWER: THE CASE OF
INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS.

The debate over the constitutional status of federal internal
improvements unfolded in several installments between 1817 and 1850.
Each episode centered on a specific public-works project for a road, a
canal, a river or harbor, or a railroad. Each round of the debate involved
different parties, including presidents James Madison, James Monroe, and
Andrew Jackson, as well as senators John C. Calhoun, Henry Clay, Daniel
Webster, and Stephen A. Douglas. State legislators, including the young
Abraham Lincoln, were also important participants in the discussion.
At stake in each of these debates was a piece of congressional
legislation appropriating funds for, or otherwise overseeing, a given
improvement project that was “internal” in that it affected travel in the
interior of the nation, and sometimes also “internal” to a particular state.
In a handful of prominent cases, the president vetoed the bill. Although
some commentators have described the process as one pitting a series of
improvement-friendly Congresses against a succession of dogged White
House opponents, 45 in fact the dynamic was more complex. Despite
Thomas Jefferson’s advocacy of an agrarian republic based on
decentralized power, for example, his signing of the Ohio Enabling Act in
1802 and the treaty concluding the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 caused
contemporaries (as well as later scholars) to view him as unmistakably
committing federal funds and authority to a national program of
development.46 Other presidents, such as John Quincy Adams, as well as

44

See Metzger, supra note __, at 84 (describing NFIB as “challeng[ing] th[e] basic
constitutional consensus” that “the fight over the federal government’s proper role in the
economic sphere” is “largely political, not constitutional”); see generally THE HEALTH
CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 111 (Nathaniel
Persily, Gillian Metzger, & Trevor Morrison eds., 2013) (discussing constitutional issues
surrounding NFIB); see also Dole, 483 U.S. at 216 (noting that the Court had not
invalidated an act of Congress on the basis of the Spending Clause since 1936).
45
See, e.g., Baker, supra note __ (Constitutional Ambiguities).
46
See DANIEL FELLER, THE PUBLIC LANDS IN JACKSONIAN POLITICS (citing JQA);
MERRILL D. PETERSON, THE JEFFERSON IMAGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND (1998); RICHARD
E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC
(1971); DREW MCCOY, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS: JAMES MADISON AND THE
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presidential hopefuls John C. Calhoun and Henry Clay, embraced broad
federal power to oversee internal improvements.47
A simple story of a succession of Congresses motivated by a
combination of partisan and economic interests, pitted against a series of
Constitution-embracing presidents, does not match the reality of crosscutting regional, partisan, and economic coalitions. Indeed, as the
repeated calls for a constitutional amendment permitting internal
improvements suggest, many participants in the debate agreed that as a
practical matter, Congress ought to have the power to fund such projects.
Disputes arose because contemporaries embraced widely conflicting views
of constitutional text and structure, and they took those views seriously
when confronted with internal improvements proposals.
As contemporaries and scholars alike have noted, the internal
improvements debates unfolded across a series of galvanizing moments.
Four of these moments are especially helpful in illuminating the multiple
constitutional frameworks at work in the interbellum period: (1)
Madison’s veto of the legislation known as the “Bonus Bill” in 1817; (2)
Monroe’s change of opinion on the constitutionality of internal
improvements between his inauguration in 1817 and his veto of the
Cumberland Road Bill in 1822; (3) Jackson’s rejection of internal
improvements, culminating in his veto of the Maysville Road Bill in 1830;
and (4) congressional debates over land grants to states to build railroads,
culminating in the passage of the Illinois Central Railroad Bill in 1850.
Each of these moments provides a snapshot of the interbellum
Constitution as it was being contested and defined in the course of
political and legal struggle. Taken together, the debates illustrate the
terrain in which constitutional interpretation was taking place in the early
nineteenth century. As contemporaries battled over the propriety of
specific internal improvements programs and distinguished between
permissible and impermissible uses of congressional authority, they
sharpened their conceptions of Article I enumerated powers and the Tenth
Amendment. For modern constitutional scholars, these fiery debates
demonstrate the distinctiveness of the early-nineteenth-century
Constitution. They show us familiar text but render it utterly foreign by
upending modern presumptions about what the text meant then, and thus
what it might mean now.
A.

The Bonus Bill: Madison’s Presidential Finale (1817).

On March 3, 1817, James Madison performed his last official act
as president by vetoing a bill supported by a venerable group of
47
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congressmen, including John C. Calhoun and Henry Clay. The bill, titled
“An act to set apart and pledge certain funds for internal improvements,”48
proposed to allocate a $1.5 million federal revenue “bonus” and future
dividends from the Second Bank of the United States to a fund “for
constructing roads and canals and improving the navigation of
watercourses.”49 Federal funding for internal improvements projects had
been debated at least since 1808, when Treasury Secretary Albert
Gallatin’s Report on Public Roads and Canals had made the case for
linking the increasingly important interior of the United States with the
coast.50 The War of 1812, combined with the decline of the Federalist
Party, had temporarily halted the drive to enact a federal internal
improvements policy. But in the aftermath of the war, with markets
booming and the Second Bank freshly chartered in 1816, nationalist
sentiment swelled, and in February 1817 the Bonus Bill passed in the
House and Senate, arriving on Madison’s desk four days before his term
ended.
Madison, who had after all prosecuted a war despite substantial
sectional opposition and signed the charter for the new Bank of the United
States, astounded the bill’s supporters by announcing his intention to veto
it.51 Ignoring Clay’s pointed suggestion that he “leave the bill to your
successor,”52 Madison took the veto pen in hand. In so doing, he avoided
the mistake one of his predecessors had made a dozen years previously of
leaving ambiguity surrounding the status of his final official acts.53 The
veto was unequivocal: Madison believed that the Constitution did not
grant Congress the authority to oversee internal improvements.54
Madison’s veto message offered a forceful refutation of Congress’s
plan to set apart and pledge certain funds for internal improvements. In
returning the bill to the House, Madison noted “the insuperable difficulty I
48
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feel in reconciling the bill with the Constitution of the United States.”55
His argument was straightforward: the power to fund internal
improvements was not included among the enumerated powers of
Congress set forth in Article I, section 8; nor was it necessary and proper
to the execution of any of those powers.56 Internal improvements did not
fall within the compass of the Commerce Clause or the General Welfare
Clause, Madison wrote. Moreover, he cautioned against viewing the latter
clause – to which he referred as “the clause to provide for common
defense and general welfare” – as a “general power” rather than a “defined
and limited” head of authority.57 Properly understood, Madison insisted,
the power to provide for the common defense and general welfare
extended only to “the expenditure of money” – no mean power, he wrote,
“money being the ordinary and necessary means” of executing “all the
great and most important measures of Government.”58 Furthermore, the
fact that a state might agree to the exercise of federal power in the domain
of internal improvements, or the suggestion that the act of Congress might
itself amount to consent, was irrelevant to the analysis. According to
Madison, “[t]he only cases in which the consent and cession of particular
States can extend the power of Congress are those specified and provided
for in the Constitution.”59
This was not to say, however, that Madison believed that a federal
internal improvements program could never be enacted. On the contrary:
Madison suggested that he would readily support such legislation if it was
based upon the proper textual foundation. The veto message described the
president as “cherishing the hope” that the “beneficial objects” of the bill
would be accomplished through a constitutional amendment explicitly
granting Congress the power to oversee internal improvements.60 The
funding of public works projects in the states was not necessarily beyond
the scope of congressional power; it simply required the people’s genius to
express its will that such authority be added to the legislative ambit.
The veto message left obscure the precise nature of the
congressional authority at issue in the Bonus Bill. Both before and after
55
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Madison issued his veto, however, legislators had dissected and
taxonomized the elements of the bill. In the House debates prior to the
bill’s passage, Calhoun distinguished between the power to build roads or
canals and the power to appropriate money. Congress did not need the
power to “cut” a road or canal in order for the bill to survive, Calhoun
argued; rather, the bill was simply an application of Congress’ ordinary
power to appropriate money.61 The constitutional issue, therefore, was the
power to appropriate, not the power to carry out the underlying action for
which the appropriation was being done. And, Calhoun continued, the
power to appropriate under the General Welfare Clause could not credibly
be limited to the enumerated powers absent clear limiting language to that
effect. Cannily citing the examples of the Louisiana Purchase and the
Cumberland Road (both the products of the Jefferson administration),62
Calhoun sketched the many “instances of money appropriated without any
reference to the enumerated powers.”63 Other supporters of the bill argued
that it was covered under the commerce power, the power to establish post
roads, or the “common defense” portion of the general welfare power.64
Opponents, meanwhile, anticipated Madison’s arguments that the bill was
an unwarranted extension of federal power into the domain of the states;
some speakers invoked the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of power to
the states.65 Some critics also distinguished between roads and canals,
describing the latter as the appropriate object of Congress because they
“enable commercial connections across the country,” in contrast to the
fundamentally “local matter” of roads.66
Attempts to classify the precise nature of the congressional power
that was at stake recurred throughout the internal improvements debates.
Was the relevant power one of appropriation, execution, ongoing
jurisdiction, or some combination? If it was appropriation, was the
proposed expenditure a proper use of the general welfare power? If one
believed that Congress needed to point to a more substantive enumerated
power in order to carry out public works projects, which power (if any)
best fit the stated purposes of the program – commerce, post roads,
common defense, or something else?67
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Moreover, the related themes of state consent and the possibility of
a constitutional amendment continued to sound throughout the period. A
proposed amendment introduced on the floor of the Senate nine months
after the Bonus Bill veto was both a speech act by a state (here, Virginia)
and a formal textual rule that made state authorization necessary for
internal improvements programs. The draft provision granted Congress
the power to appropriate money for roads, canals, and watercourses
provided “[t]hat no road or canal, shall be conducted in any State, nor the
navigation of its waters improved, without the consent of such State.”68 In
the years following Madison’s veto of the Bonus Bill, state consent would
become a leitmotif of the debates over internal improvements.
Commentators focused not only on the ongoing need for agreement by the
states to specific public works projects, but also the original terms under
which the post-1787 states had joined the Union.
B.

Roads I: Bargains with the States (1817-22).

On Tuesday, March 4, 1817, the day after Madison vetoed the
Bonus Bill, James Monroe took office as president. His inaugural address
that day suggested that Clay might have been correct to suspect that the
new president would be friendlier to internal improvements. But
Monroe’s views on the issue changed several times over the course of his
two terms. In December 1817, Monroe announced his opposition to
internal improvements. Five years later, a road bill again stood at the
center of public debate, and again it met with the veto. Yet again, the
president accompanied his veto with a statement explaining his views – in
this case, a sixty-page pamphlet.
Monroe’s inaugural address contained a paragraph with the
potential to mollify both supporters and foes of internal improvements.
The speech depicted roads and canals as the connective tissue that would
“bind the Union more closely together.”69 These channels of national
feeling would also “facilitate[e] the intercourse between the States” and
“add much to the convenience and comfort of our fellow-citizens, much to
the ornament of the country.” 70 Yet Monroe also used language
suggesting that his administration might not reject altogether his
predecessor’s resistance to a broad congressional power over roads and
canals. His first reference to internal improvements came with a caveat:
among the “interests of high importance” that would “claim attention”
Annals of Congress, House of Representatives, 15th Congress, 1st sess., 1271 (Mar. 11,
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68
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from the new chief magistrate would be “the improvement of our country
by roads and canals, proceeding always with a constitutional sanction.”71
Did the new president believe that the Constitution as currently written
contained such a sanction, such that this was a descriptive statement, or
was he cautioning his listeners to distinguish carefully between
permissible and impermissible uses of congressional power? Monroe’s
statement left room for different interpretations. Clearly, though, Monroe
shared Madison’s view that the internal improvements question was not
just a political disagreement but also a debate about the meaning of the
Constitution.
Nine months later, in December 1817, the new president launched
an unambiguous salvo against internal improvements. His first annual
message to Congress announced his “settled conviction” that Congress
“do not possess the right” to “establish such a system of improvement.”72
Monroe acknowledged that this position represented a shift from the views
he had previously articulated, describing himself as “[d]isregarding early
impressions.”73 His objection stemmed from what he now regarded as a
lack of the constitutional sanction he had invoked in his inaugural address.
The power to establish internal improvements, Monroe maintained, was
“not contained in any of the specified powers granted to Congress,” nor
could it be viewed as “incidental to or a necessary means, viewed on the
most liberal scale, for carrying into effect any of the powers which are
specifically granted.”74 The ability to promote internal improvements
simply was not contained in Congress’s array of Article I powers.
Importantly, however, Monroe echoed Madison’s suggestion that
the textual landscape was capable of being altered. Monroe urged
Congress to recognize the “propriety” of “recommending to the States the
adoption of an amendment to the Constitution which shall give to
Congress the right in question.”75 Monroe thus assured his audience that
he, too, believed in the utility of federal internal improvements. Such a
power in Congress would be useful as a practical matter, but a specific
textual authorization was needed to add the power to the federal legislative
arsenal. Monroe appeared sanguine about such an amendment’s chances
of success. Again like Madison, he suggested that the political entity of
“the people” stood ready to deliberate about potential changes to the
constitutional text: “We may confidently rely that it if appears to their
satisfaction that the power is necessary, it will always be granted.”76 The
people were no longer “out of doors”; on the contrary, they were
71
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somewhere nearby, ready to be gaveled into action and to oblige their
representatives with a burst of higher-lawmaking.77 “In cases of doubtful
construction,” Monroe maintained, “it comports with the nature and origin
of our institutions, and will contribute much to preserve them, to apply to
our constituents for an explicit grant of the power.” 78 Triggering a
constitutional amendment appeared entirely feasible to interbellum
commentators, in contrast to the modern view of the Article V process as
effectively impossible except in rare circumstances.79 For some earlynineteenth-century commentators, the text of the Constitution virtually
invited the people to revise their foundational law on occasion – or, in any
event, when invited to do so by their representatives.
Monroe’s newly stringent views galvanized Clay and other
congressional supporters of internal improvements into action. In addition
to continuing to draft amendments granting Congress the relevant new
enumerated power, advocates of internal improvements in the House
convened a select committee to respond to Monroe’s annual message.
Two days after being convened by Speaker Clay, the committee, chaired
by Henry St. George Tucker, son of the venerable Virginia judge and
treatise-writer, produced a report that forcefully rebutted Monroe’s claims.
The Tucker committee’s report emphasized two themes: first, the consent
of the states; second, the distinction among the power to appropriate funds
for internal improvements, the power to construct roads and canals, and
the power to maintain ongoing jurisdiction in those improvements.80
As a matter of text and precedent, the report argued, if a given state
consented to a specific federal internal improvements program, that
program was a constitutional exercise of one of the enumerated powers
(post offices and post roads, common defense, or commerce), or else
necessary and proper to the execution of those powers. The report thus
offered a cooperative vision of internal improvements federalism. A road,
the argument went, was the product of combining a state’s territorial
sovereignty with federal funds and, even more important, with the impetus
to connect across federal space. Therefore, although “the constitution
confers only a right of way, and that the rights of soil and jurisdiction
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remain exclusively with the states,” the report argued that “there seems no
sound objection to the improvement of roads with their assent.”81
Significantly, the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of powers to the
states and the people appeared to the committee to present no bar to this
focus on state consent. On the contrary: the report pointed to the Tenth
Amendment as the source of the state’s right to consent. “For if, by the
10th amendment, this right is reserved to the states, it is within the power
of the state to grant it, unless the United States are incapable of receiving
such a privilege.”82 The members of the Tucker committee thus viewed
the Tenth Amendment not as a defensive bulwark to be invoked against
invasions of state sovereignty, but rather as a fount of the state’s own legal
powers, including the power to consent (or not) to the introduction of a
federal right of way. The state’s ability to grant or withhold its consent to
a particular improvement project therefore obviated the need for a general
constitutional amendment.83 On this view, federalism could be preserved
by placing the burden on individual states to opt out of congressional
regulation, rather than by requiring Congress to point to a particular
enumerated power (and to launch a popular movement to add one to the
text if none existed). In an inversion of much of the Court’s modern
federalism jurisprudence, a broad view of states safeguarding their own
power under the Tenth Amendment outweighed a narrow view of
Congress’s particular heads of power.84
To be sure, the consent-based view articulated in the Tucker
committee report was contested in the period. In a letter to Tucker shortly
after the report was published, Madison challenged the report’s consentbased theory.85 Madison wrote that he could not “concur in the latitude of
Construction taken in the Report, or in the principle that the Consent of
States, even of a single one, can enlarge the jurisdiction of the Gen[era]l
Gov[ernmen]t.”86 Consequently, he did not share the Tucker committee
report’s call for the Bonus Bill to be revived absent a constitutional
amendment.87
In addition to its emphasis on state consent, the Tucker report also
differentiated among various slices of congressional power over internal
improvements, especially the powers of appropriation, execution, and
81
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jurisdiction. The report culminated with its strongest claim: the claim that
Congress possessed the authority to execute federal internal improvements
programs directly. In other words, Congress could itself “construct roads
and canals through the several states” (again, with consent).88 This power
did not extend to “jurisdictional rights,” which remained with the states.89
Jurisdictional rights were understood to refer to ongoing regulations of the
road or canal in question – for example, tollgates. As for the
appropriations power, the report rejected Monroe’s view that the exercise
of such a power amounted to an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to
“establish” internal improvements. Unlike an attempt to assert jurisdiction
over the road or canal, and thereby to “federalize” it, an appropriation was
a limited federal intervention at the beginning of a project. The theory
was that Congress would appropriate funds, but the construction would be
carried out by the state.90 The Tucker report pointed to the expansive
nature of the “common defense and general welfare” provision of Article I,
sec. 8 to bolster its claim for a congressional power of appropriation as an
absolute constitutional minimum.
The House’s response to the Tucker report accepted the
committee’s spectrum of congressional powers but stopped short of the
echoing its full-throated endorsement of expansive federal authority. The
full chamber passed a nonbinding resolution granting Congress the power
to appropriate money for the construction of “post roads, military, and
other roads, and of canals,” but the committee’s three others resolutions
providing for actual federal construction failed. 91
For many
contemporaries, then, the broad contours of the General Welfare Clause
provided a sound textual basis for federal funding to the states, who would
in turn apply the money to build roads and canals. But the other
enumerated powers were regarded by many interbellum Americans as
insufficient to give Congress the authority to build the roads and canals
itself.
Monroe’s second term brought renewed public attention to these
questions, with a new focus. In the wake of the Tucker committee report,
Secretary of War Calhoun produced his own report setting forth the
benefits of a system of roads and canals for military as well as commercial
purposes.92 But the next major event in the internal improvements drama
was Monroe’s veto of the Cumberland Road bill in 1822.
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The origins of the Cumberland Road lay in the negotiations
surrounding Ohio’s organization as a state beginning in 1802 and
admission to the Union in 1803. Pursuant to its admission compact, Ohio
was guaranteed that Congress would set aside five percent of all future net
proceeds from the sale of lands in the state to build roads.93 Three percent
of the proceeds were to be spent on roads within Ohio, and two percent
were to be spent on roads leading to Ohio from other states.94 The roads
connecting the state with the eastern seaboard were of particular concern
to Ohioans, who wanted to ensure access to coastal cities and markets.
The Cumberland Road (sometimes known as the National Road95) was
built as part of this program, extending from Cumberland, Maryland (on
the Potomac River) west through Ohio, eventually ending at Vandalia,
Illinois. The road received congressional approval in 1806, and
construction began in 1811.96
For the first eleven years of its existence, the Cumberland Road
was relatively uncontroversial, despite the ongoing disputes about the
status of internal improvements. The road’s origins in Ohio’s admission
compact led contemporaries to view it as a product of contract, rather than
constitutional, law. 97 Consequently, the road routinely received
appropriations, even during periods when Congress or the president were
otherwise resistant to funding roads and canals.
All this changed in 1822, however, when Congress passed a bill to
repair the Cumberland Road. Crucially, the bill also provided for the
installation of “toll houses, gates, and turnpikes” on the road.98 This
93
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provision proved the bill’s undoing. The following day, Monroe vetoed
the bill. The president accompanied his veto with a lengthy pamphlet
titled Views on the Subject of Internal Improvements.
Monroe objected to the Cumberland Road bill because he viewed it
as a dramatic expansion of congressional power over internal
improvements. As in his first annual message of 1817, he insisted that if
such a power was to be exercised, it must be grounded in a constitutional
amendment. While Monroe agreed with the contemporary consensus that
the initial construction of the road was unproblematic insofar as it
stemmed from Ohio’s admission compact,99 he argued that the new bill
was an unprecedented expansion of congressional power. In practice, the
“preservation and repair” of the road meant that federal officials would be
stationed along a road traversing the interior of the nation, with a perpetual
brief to demand money from travelers and merchants. “A power to
establish turnpikes with gates and tolls, and to enforce the collection of
tolls by penalties, implies a power to adopt and execute a complete system
of internal improvement,” Monroe warned.100 The veto message conjured
the specter of presidentially appointed toll collectors as the vanguard of “a
complete right of jurisdiction and sovereignty for all the purposes of
internal improvement.”101 The fact that the officials would be appointed
by the president rather than by Congress did not appear to assuage
Monroe’s fears; rather, the bill’s entire toll-gathering structure amounted
to an unconstitutional overreach by Congress.102
and three-quarter cents; for either of the carriages last mentioned, with
four horses, twenty-five cents. For every other carriage of pleasure,
under whatever name it may go, the like sum, according to the number
of wheels and hones drawing the same. For every cart or wagon, whose
wheels do not exceed the breadth of four inches, six and one-fourth
cents for each horse or ox drawing the same. For every cart or wagon,
whose wheels shall exceed in breadth four inches, and not exceeding
six inches, three cents for every horse or ox drawing the same; and
every other cart or wagon, whose wheels shall exceed six inches, shall
pass the said gates free and clear of toll.
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Yet Monroe’s attack on the bill also contained a modulation of his
earlier views. In contrast to his suggestion in the 1817 annual message
that Congress might lack the power even to appropriate funds for internal
improvements, the 1822 veto message distinguished between the ongoing
“right of jurisdiction and sovereignty” and the power to make occasional
appropriations.103 Appropriations might be justified if the state in question
consented, but Monroe contended that the states lacked the power to
consent to federal jurisdiction and sovereignty.104 The fact that the entire
Ohio congressional delegation had voted for the bill seemed not to matter
to Monroe’s evaluation of whether the state in question had consented.105
Similarly, in Views of the President of the United States on the Subject of
Internal Improvements, Monroe reaffirmed his opposition to the Tucker
committee’s expansive view of state consent. But he also diverged from
the narrow theory of appropriations that Madison had articulated in his
veto of the Bonus Bill. Whereas Madison had insisted on a narrow
reading of the spending power under the General Welfare Clause, Monroe
now read the Constitution to grant Congress “the right to appropriate” but
not “the right to make internal improvements.”106 Consistent with this
analysis, Monroe proposed that Congress revise the bill to provide
appropriations for repairs to the road but omit the tollgate plan.107 At the
boundary between appropriations and jurisdiction, then, Monroe viewed
the Tenth Amendment as shifting from a declaration of states’ rights to a
restraint on the states’ power to give up those rights.
With his Views of the President on the Subject of Internal
Improvements, Monroe moved beyond his constitutional obligation to
communicate objections after presentment, 108 taking his views to the
coordinate branches of government, and indeed to a broader public
stage.109 The president went so far as to send copies of the veto message
and the pamphlet to the members of the Supreme Court. Chief Justice
John Marshall replied with a brief and hedging letter of acknowledgment.
After noting that he had read the materials “with great attention and
toll-gatherers, to demand and receive, for passing the said turnpikes, the tolls and rates
hereinafter mentioned.”).
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interest,” Marshall concluded with a vague set of observations on internal
improvements. The chief justice termed the president’s views “profound”
and “most generally just.”110 He then made the following observation:
A general power over internal improvement, if to be
exercised by the Union, would certainly be cumbersome to
the government, & of no utility to the people. But, to the
extent you recommend, it would be productive of no
mischief, and of great good. I despair however of the
adoption of such a measure.111
Marshall appeared to agree with Monroe’s distinction between
appropriations for road and canal construction on one hand, and ongoing
federal management of tolls and traffic on the other hand. But these views
are surprising from the chief justice who, two years later, would read the
Commerce and Supremacy Clauses to find that a federal coasting statute
preempted a state steamboat monopoly in Gibbons v. Ogden.112
In contrast to Marshall’s temporizing, the outspoken associate
justice William Johnson responded to Monroe’s mailing with an overtly
nationalist view of internal improvements more in line with what one
might have expected from Marshall. Stating that his “Brother Judges” had
“instructed” him in his reply, Johnson maintained that the Court’s decision
two years earlier in McCulloch v. Maryland should also be viewed as the
justices’ opinion on the constitutionality of internal improvements. The
Court’s decision to uphold Congress’s establishment of the Second Bank
and deny Maryland’s power to tax the Bank, Johnson argued, “completely
commits them on the subject of internal improvement, as applied to
Postroads and Military Roads.”113
Monroe’s veto of the Cumberland Road bill capped five years of
intense efforts by two presidents and numerous members of Congress to
articulate a theory of internal improvements. Throughout the debates,
there was broad agreement that roads and canals were desirable and even
necessary to carry passengers, produce, news, and goods throughout the
expanding nation. Even in Madison’s and Monroe’s strongest veto
messages, each of them took pains to note that the projects themselves
would likely bring substantial benefits. “I am not unaware of the great
importance of roads and canals and the improved navigation of water
courses,” Madison wrote, “and that a power in the National Legislature to
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provide for them might be exercised with signal advantage to the general
prosperity.”114
But both presidents insisted that any general congressional power
to develop substantive internal improvements plans must be grounded in a
constitutional amendment; it simply did not exist in their view of the text.
Madison and Monroe therefore urged Congress to continue the founders’
drafting process by using the amendment process to add another
enumerated power to the list found in Article I. The prospect of
appropriations alone, meanwhile, raised textual and structural questions
about how the General Welfare Clause fit into the list of congressional
powers, and into the system of federalism more broadly. This wideranging interrogation of different levels of constitutional proposals to deal
with the internal improvements question continued for decades after
Monroe’s veto of the Cumberland Road bill.
C.

Roads II: Money versus Land (1826-30).

The internal improvements debate entered a new phase with
Andrew Jackson’s election to the presidency in 1828. In 1828, as in the
bitter 1824 contest that Jackson ultimately lost to John Quincy Adams, the
internal improvements question was intertwined with other highly
controversial issues including the tariff, the retirement of the national debt
and the resulting prospect of a federal budget surplus, and the expansion
of slavery.115 Consequently, Jackson viewed internal improvements as a
site to demonstrate his commitment to local markets and his belief that the
powers of the national government (or, at any rate, Congress) ought to be
limited. Jackson ultimately vetoed six internal improvement bills, four of
them through the pocket veto.116 It was the Maysville Road veto, however,
that reignited the internal improvements blaze and sent Jackson and his
lieutenant Martin Van Buren scrambling to find support for their positions
in text and precedent.
The Maysville Road was connected both spatially and conceptually
to the vexed Cumberland Road. The bill authorized the federal
government to purchase $150,000 worth of stock in a Kentucky
corporation, the Maysville, Washington, Paris, and Lexington Turnpike
Road Company, which would in turn build a road connecting the
Cumberland Road at Zanesville, Ohio, with the Tennessee River at
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Florence, Alabama.117 Unlike the Cumberland Road bill that Monroe had
rejected, the Maysville Road bill contemplated an appropriation rather
than ongoing federal control. Shares, not tollgates, were at stake in 1830.
The bill was vigorously debated in the House for three days and
ultimately passed by a vote of 102 to 86.118 The bill was rapidly returned
to the House by Jackson’s nephew and secretary, Andrew Jackson
Donelson, with the news that the president had declined to sign it. After
the obligatory claim of support for internal improvements in general,119
Jackson’s veto message cited two principal problems with the bill: first, its
assertion of what Jackson regarded as an unconstitutional extension of the
appropriations power; and second, its attempt to extend federal power into
what Jackson viewed as the inherently local domain of the states.
For the appropriations point, Jackson drew heavily on Madison’s
veto of the Bonus Bill and Monroe’s veto of the Cumberland Road bill.
Despite decades of practice dating back to the Louisiana Purchase that had
expanded the appropriations power, Jackson suggested that a proper
understanding of the text argued against such an interpretation. Although
he noted the necessity of ceding to “a well settled acquiescence of the
people and confederated authorities in particular constructions of the
constitution, on doubtful points,” the rest of the message implied that the
tenuous origins of the appropriations power required strict
interpretation.120 From a textual standpoint, Jackson suggested that he
supported a narrow construction of Congress’s power under the General
Welfare Clause. According to this view, the scope of the spending power
was limited to performing an ancillary function to the enumerated powers.
In other words, Congress could appropriate money from general federal
funds only to carry out its enumerated powers, and not in the service of a
broader notion of the general welfare. The Madisonian approach, in other
words, was still alive.121
Of course, one consequence of this distinction between the
spending power and the enumerated powers was to create an opening for
supporters of internal improvements to use the appropriations power as a
wedge to create an opening for Congress to act. On this point, Jackson
cited Madison, pointing to the Bonus Bill veto as evidence of the need to
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distinguish between the appropriations power and the power to execute
improvements projects.122 But in correspondence with Van Buren, the
seventy-nine-year-old Madison protested that this claim mischaracterized
his 1817 veto. On the contrary, Madison insisted,
It was an object of the Veto to deny to Congress, as well
the appropriating power, as the executing and jurisdictional
branches of it. And it is believed that this was the general
understanding at the time, and has continued to be so,
according to the references occasionally made to the
document. Whether the language employed duly conveyed
the meaning of which J. M. retains the consciousness, is a
question on which he does not presume to judge for
others.123
According to Madison, then, his 1817 veto had extended to the
appropriations power as well as the power of carrying out internal
improvements.124
Jackson did not press the claim in his veto quite so far, however.
Perhaps because he sought to preserve the appropriations power as applied
to other types of improvements such as lighthouses and military
fortifications,125 he presented himself as willing to tolerate the acquiescedin view of the appropriations power that he believed had emerged in
practice since the 1790s.126 Rather than launching an attack on practice,
Jackson introduced a different limiting factor into the analysis.
Appropriations for internal improvements were constitutional only to the
extent that they adhered to what Jackson termed a “general principle”:
“that the works which might be thus aided, should be ‘of a general, not
local – national, not state’ character.”127 Collapsing the boundary between
122
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general and local, national and state, Jackson argued, would “of necessity
lead to the subversion of the federal system.”128 The Maysville Road
simply did not meet the requirement of national character, he wrote,
because it had “no connection with any established system of
improvements” and was “exclusively within the limits of a State, starting
at a point on the Ohio River and running out sixty miles to an interior
town.”129 The local-national distinction crystallized much of the past
decades’ debates about internal improvements. The Maysville Road veto
was widely popular, in part because the distinction appeared to capture
some essential truth about the federal system. “The veto message was a
hodgepodge of constitutional and expedient arguments,” notes Daniel
Feller, “but in its very logical fuzziness lay its political strength.”130
Indeed, the local-national approach to internal improvements
questions had emerged a few years before it achieved prominence the
Maysville Road veto. Prior to the Maysville controversy – indeed, prior to
Jackson’s election – Madison and then-Senator Van Buren exchanged a
series of letters on the subject of internal improvements.131 Van Buren
initiated the correspondence by requesting Madison’s views on a
constitutional amendment that Van Buren had proposed. “There is not in
my opinion any other matter so threatening to the confederacy as the
pretension of the Federal Government upon this subject,” the New York
senator wrote to the retired president.
At this moment, the assumed power is used by the
Government as a most powerful, indeed irresist[i]ble
engine, to acquire the favour & secure the allegiance of
portions of the union at the expense of those who having
made the constitution know what it cost & what it is worth.
It is supposed that an extension of the money power beyond
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that of Jurisdiction is practicable and indispensable to the
successful operation of the Government.132
Van Buren concluded with a bold petition not only for Madison’s views,
but for a draft revision to the Constitution’s text. “If agreeable it would
please me to have an amendment worded by yourself; but it does not
become me to be more particular.” Van Buren then promptly closed by
tendering his regards to Mrs. Madison.133
In his correspondence with Madison, Van Buren thus emphasized
both the appropriations-jurisdiction distinction. Madison replied with a
letter in which he outlined a range of possible structural mechanisms to
address what he regarded as the constitutional problem of internal
improvements. Madison sketched three options: (1) a functional division
of power between the general government and the states; (2) a
constitutional amendment granting Congress the power to appropriate for
internal improvements; (3) a constitutional amendment granting Congress
a general power over internal improvements; or (4) a more profound
constitutional amendment revising the language of the General Welfare
Clause.
Madison began by evaluating a functional separation between
federal and state authority: “dividing the power between the General &
State Govt by allotting the appropriation branch to the former & reserving
the jurisdiction to the latter.”134 According to this subject-matter-based
division of legislative power, Congress would have the power to
appropriate funds for internal improvements, but execution of the
programs and jurisdiction over the finished projects would be the state’s
domain.135 While this tidy line-drawing had “doubtless, a captivating
aspect,” however, Madison rejected the solution based on “the difficulty of
defining such a division and maintaining it in practice.” 136 As the
previous decades’ debates had shown, the line between appropriations and
jurisdiction was a fuzzy one. Was the construction of toll gates on the
Cumberland Road an exercise of the spending power, or was it an attempt
to exert ongoing federal control over traffic and commerce on the road?
Moreover, Madison was skeptical that the people of the United States
would be willing to fund projects and then give up the ability to monitor
and control those projects to “ensure their constant subserviency to
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national purposes.”137 Given the lack of clear boundaries, Congress would
eventually expand its domain to include jurisdiction, but with no textual or
structural basis to rein in such reaching.
Rather than a murky division between types of power, Madison
advocated a step that would “obviate the unconstitutional precedent” of
past decades, while also recognizing the growth in the “constructive
authority” of Congress over that period.138 Madison thus proposed two
types of constitutional amendment. One would give Congress a new
enumerated power over internal improvements, but only for appropriations.
Such an amendment would read “Congress may make appropriations of
money for roads & Canals, to be applied to such purposes by the
Legislatures of the States within their respective limits, the jurisdiction of
the States remaining unimpaired.”139 Congress would thus give funds to
state legislatures to be used for roads and canals, and the state legislatures
would carry out the projects. But what would happen if a state refused?
Madison did not discuss this possibility in the letter to Van Buren. An
earlier draft amendment introduced in the Senate in 1817 had granted
Congress the power to appropriate money for internal improvements,
provided that the state in question consented to the project. 140 The
inclusion of a consent provision implied that a state could refuse road or
canal funding. Madison’s language, however, contained no such provision,
leaving open the question whether a state could decline the federal money.
In his second suggested amendment, Madison proposed granting to
Congress the entire bundle of powers relating to internal improvements.
His draft amendment stated, “Congress may make roads & Canals with
such jurisdiction as the cases may require.”141 Unlike the appropriations
amendment, this provision contemplated an appropriation by Congress,
followed by federal – not state – officials and engineers handling the
actual construction projects. Again, Madison appeared to be taking a
realist view based on what he regarded as the slow creep of congressional
power over the past decades, for he noted that an amendment granting the
full jurisdictional power might be preferable given “the moral certainty,
that it will be constructively assumed, with the sanction of the national
will, and operate as an injurious precedent.”142 Again, an amendment
would avoid messy line-drawing exercises and would also permit a fresh
start on firmer constitutional ground. If Congress was likely to
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accumulate power anyway, Madison implied that it was better to cabin the
power ex ante with a constitutional amendment.
Madison’s final suggestion to Van Buren was an amendment with
a potentially greater reach beyond the realm of internal improvements than
either of the previous two. This amendment proposed to revise the
language of the General Welfare Clause in such as way as to settle the
controversy about its scope that dated back to the founding.143 In contrast
to the views of Alexander Hamilton and others, Madison had long argued
that the clause ought to be understood as an auxiliary to the enumerated
powers – an enabling act that granted Congress the power to tax and spend
to carry out its commerce, postal, monetary, war, and other enumerated
powers.144 At this point in the letter to Van Buren, Madison’s language
took a more forceful tone: “[W]hilst the terms ‘Common defence &
general welfare’ remain in the Constitution, unguarded against the
construction which has been contended for, a fund of power inexhaustible,
& wholly subversive of the equilibrium between the General and the State
Governments, is within the reach” of the general government,” he
argued.145 To prevent a vast (and, he suggested, unintended) expansion of
federal power, Madison suggested two solutions. One was to add a new
amendment “expunging the phrase [‘common defense and general
welfare’], which is not required for any harmless meaning; the other was
to “mak[e] it harmless” by adding to the end of the General Welfare
Clause the limiting phrase “in cases authorized by this Constitution.”146
Either of these approaches would end the controversy about the scope of
the taxing and spending authority. It was not an independent power,
Madison claimed, merely an aid to the (other, genuine) enumerated
powers.
Madison’s letter containing the proposed amendments crossed in
the mail with a letter from Van Buren enclosing a new report from the
Senate committee on roads and canals. Aside from a brief, shared
speculation as to George Washington’s attitudes toward internal
improvements, correspondence between the two trailed off until 1830,
when Madison revived it with his letter informing Van Buren that
Jackson’s message accompanying the Maysville Road Veto had not
accurately captured the logic behind Madison’s veto of the Bonus Bill.
These discussions of internal improvements between 1826 and
1830 illustrate the struggles of actors as diverse as Jackson and Madison to
create a proper framework for understanding the internal power, and an
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appropriate constitutional box – textual, structural, and practical – in
which the power might operate. Notably, each of them, like Monroe,
supported a constitutional amendment granting Congress some power over
internal improvements. Rather than continue the fight at the level of
struggles over particular legislation, they thought in terms of revising and
fixing the text, even if it meant enshrining a particular substantive view
that was not their preferred approach.
D.

Roads III: Land to the States, Charters to the Corporations
(1850).

For some scholars, Jackson’s veto of the Maysville Road bill was
the “beginning of the end” of ambitious national programs of internal
improvements.147 Internal improvements bills continued to be debated in
Congress, especially public works involving rivers and harbors.148 While
the era of the classic internal improvements bill for a canal or a turnpike
had largely passed by the mid-1830s, the 1840s and 1850s brought new
transportation technology as well as a distinct set of constitutional
concerns and approaches. The growth of railroads raised some new issues
and put a different emphasis on some old ones. Examining the debates in
this period, in particular the establishment of the Illinois Central Railroad
in 1850, illuminates the contemporary constitutional framework because it
allows us to see a constitutional workaround in action. That workaround
was the mechanism of the federal land grant to a state for the purpose of
establishing a railroad.
By the 1840s, politicians who supported internal improvements
had begun to shift their focus from direct congressional regulation to land
grants from Congress to the states. As the historian Yonatan Eyal puts it,
a group of “development-minded Democrats used land grants to skirt the
question of the constitutionality of federally sponsored internal
improvements.”149 The grants operated in the following manner:
Congress would donate public lands so that state
governments themselves could use them for improvements.
This would obviate endless controversy about the propriety
of directly creating a road or a lighthouse and would
contribute to the same goal of building up the new western
states. When desirous of constructing a railroad, for
example, Congress would grant alternate sections of public
147

Feller, supra note __, at 141-42.
James K. Polk vetoed a major river and harbor improvements bill in 1846. See also
the Memphis Convention debates over internal improvements in 1845.
149
YONATAN EYAL, THE YOUNG AMERICA MOVEMENT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1828-1861, at 47 (2007).
148

32

land for the project. The sections of land not donated could
then be sold at a much higher price, since the availability of
rail transportation nearby would make them suddenly more
lucrative.150
As a descriptive matter, the historical account tells us about a change in
the legal and political mechanism that interbellum Americans applied to
internal improvements questions. Land grants were more appealing than
substantive congressional regulation – whether through appropriations or
jurisdiction – because they allowed contemporaries to build railroads
while also honoring state sovereignty.
But what was the constitutional framework underlying this change
of mechanism? Why did early-nineteenth-century Americans find land
grants to states for the purpose of building railroads less objectionable
than either federal funding for, or federal construction of, a railroad?
Either approach presented opportunities for private profit and, in some
cases, graft. To the extent that the land grants came with obligations,
placed restrictions on how the states could go about building the railroad,
and indeed required significant effort and investment from the state, why
did contemporaries view them as preferable to federally directed programs
resembling the Cumberland or Maysville road plans, which might have
cost some quantum of sovereignty but required less participation by the
states?
The debates surrounding the railroad land grants provide a rich
case study of the interbellum constitutional landscape. In particular, the
congressional debates surrounding the establishment of the Illinois Central
Railroad (ICR) in 1850 throw into relief contemporary conceptions of the
commerce power, the spending power, and the Tenth Amendment. The
congressional grant of public lands to the state of Illinois, which included
a related grant to Mississippi and Alabama, on September 20, 1850, was
the first of its kind.151 Drafted by Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois,
the bill was viewed by Douglas and others as an essential step in the
program of building national infrastructure and expanding national power
across the continent.152 Within a few years, “a slew of bills proposing to
grant public lands and rights-of-way for the building of railroads, canals,
and telegraphs filled the dockets of Senate and House.”153
Historians studying the 1840s and 1850s suggest that
contemporaries viewed the land grants as a replacement for the less150
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favored mechanism of substantive internal improvements regulation.154
The orthodox historiographical story has thus held that the land grants in
some sense solved the decades-long controversy over internal
improvements. Scholars have not probed in depth what it was about the
land grants that made them more palatable to contemporaries’
constitutional taste. The fact that nineteenth-century Americans adopted
the land-grants approach suggests that they believed that an approach
under which Congress used the states to build the railroads was
constitutional – or, at any rate, less constitutionally problematic than the
alternative approach. The alternative was for Congress to send federal
engineers to build and run the railroads, akin to the proposed Maysville
Road toll collectors.
Yet concluding that the land grants seem to have been more
acceptable to contemporaries than direct regulation tells us little about
why they might have held this view. It is not at all obvious that a
commitment to robust federalism based on state sovereignty necessarily
entails a preference for land grants to the states rather than direct
congressional regulation. As the ICR debates illustrate, however,
interbellum Americans adopted the land-grants approach because it
satisfied key concerns that had plagued the previous three decades’ worth
of internal improvements arguments. These concerns centered on the role
of state consent, the appropriation-implementation and local-national
distinctions, and the need for a constitutional amendment. The ICR
debates also implicated a new set of issues, including the permissible
restrictions and conditions on land grants to the states, and the
responsibilities of the federal government as a proprietor of land. In short,
contemporaries preferred land grants to direct federal regulation because
land grants came closer to satisfying crucial interbellum concerns about
how federalism, in particular concurrent power, should operate in
action.155
The land-grants approach relied on a few important background
principles, chief among them the surveying and land-sale system
established by the Ordinance of 1785 and the Northwest Ordinance of
1787, the fact that new states were typically admitted by compact, and the
at-times controversial fact that the federal government retained ownership
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of large tracts of public lands within the borders of new states.156 The
Ordinance of 1785 set the basic units of land: the township (six miles by
six miles) and the section (one mile by one mile, or 640 acres).157 In the
ordinance, the Confederation Congress also mandated that several lots in
each township must be “reserved for the United States.”158 Two years
later, the Northwest Ordinance, one of the initial pieces of legislation
passed by the First Congress, provided that the legislatures of new states
“shall never interfere with the primary disposal of the soil by the United
States in Congress assembled, nor with any regulations Congress may find
necessary for securing the title in such soil to the bona fide purchasers.”159
In the Ohio Enabling Act of 1802, according to which Congress granted
Ohio permission to seek statehood, the federal government granted the
new state certain lands for salt springs and schools. The foundational
assumption behind the terms of admission, however, was that “the feesimple to all the lands within its limits, excepting those previously granted
or sold, should vest in the United States.”160 Consequently, many of the
states of the Old Northwest that joined the Union in the early nineteenth
century contained large tracts of federal land at the time of their admission.
The new sovereign states, in other words, accepted as a term of admission
to the Union that significant portions of their land would be held by the
general government.
This land provided a hook for Congress to reach into the states and
build railroads. In the act establishing the Illinois Central Railroad, the
sequence of transactions was clear: it announced itself as an act “granting
the right of way, and making a grant of land to the States of Illinois,
Mississippi and Alabama, in aid of the construction of a Railroad from
Chicago to Mobile.”161 Step one: grant right of way to the state; step two,
grant land surrounding that right of way to the state. Congress was not
appropriating funds for internal improvements, nor was it proposing
ongoing federal involvement with the management of traffic on the
nation’s roads. Instead, the act invoked one of the most fundamental
congressional powers: the power to dispose of public lands. 162 This
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transfer of federal land to the states simply happened to come with a
condition attached: it was “in aid of the construction of a Railroad” – or a
“road,” as contemporaries typically referred to the projects.
As Eyal’s description suggests, the specific provisions of the grant
of land to the state, and the reservation of a significant amount of other
land to the federal government, were complex. The right of way provision
was fairly straightforward: from the terminus of the Illinois and Michigan
Canal near present-day Peru, in north-central Illinois; south to Cairo,
Illinois, at the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers; with branches
eastward to Chicago and northwest to Galena, Illinois, and eventually
Dubuque, Iowa. The alternate-section requirement for the selection of the
actual parcels of land was more complicated. It provided
[t]hat there be and is hereby granted to the State of Illinois,
for the purpose of aiding in making the Railroad and
branches aforesaid, every alternate section of land
designated by even numbers, for six sections in width on
each side of said road and branches.”163
The alternate sections would thus run perpendicular from the line of the
railroad, each measuring one section (one mile) long and stretching six
sections (six miles) outward in either direction from the right of way. The
result was what was known as a “checkerboard” pattern of land ownership,
for as one progressed along the right of way, each mile would bring a new
owner. In the immediate aftermath of the bill’s passage, and given the
remoteness of the land at issue, those owners would for the most part
alternate between the State of Illinois and the federal government. Here
came the final piece of the congressional scheme: the double-price
provision, according to which the land that remained in the hands of the
United States could not be sold for less than double the minimum price of
the public lands, or $2.50 per acre.164
The ICR act set some penalties for noncompliance by the State of
Illinois. The act began by stating that the lands in question “shall be
applied to no other purpose whatsoever.” 165 More pointedly, if the
railroad was not completed within ten years, the act required Illinois to
remit to the federal government the proceeds of any of its sales of the land
associated with the grant. The same terms were applied to Alabama and
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Mississippi pursuant to a section of the act that established the Chicago
and Mobile Railroad.166
From a structural perspective, the land grants took an unusual form,
as contemporaries acknowledged. The federal government possessed
lands within the boundaries of some states that it proposed to transfer to
the state on condition that the state use the lands for a specific purpose
defined by Congress. These lands were located within states that had
previously been federal territories, even though many in the newly
sovereign states objected to this condition of statehood.167 In an 1846
debate on a similar plan for a railroad in Michigan, some senators had
voiced “old Jacksonian” concerns about the project, arguing that the land
grants were merely a cover for federal direction of internal
improvements.168 By 1850, these concerns about federal expansion and
encroachment on state power through land grants continued to haunt some
legislators. Others, however, had the opposite concern: that the grants
were suspect because they allowed a single state to derive undue benefits
from the people of the entire United States.169
When the bill was debated in the Senate, the discussion focused on
the broad issue of the relationship that the act established among Congress,
the state of Illinois, and the railroad company. Some senators objected to
the alternate-section and double-price provisions, which they viewed as
creating excessive restrictions on Illinois. They did not oppose the notion
that Congress could grant the lands in the first place, or that the lands
could be granted to a state provided that they were used for a specific
purpose. Rather, their position was that if such a grant was to take place,
the land ought to be given to the state – and its citizens – free from
conditions. “The route, it is said, will be about four hundred miles in
length, and the grant will be equivalent to a strip of land six miles wide
throughout the whole length, or one million five hundred and thirty-six
thousand acres of land,” Senator Isaac Walker of Wisconsin noted. 170
Under the terms of the ICR act, “[o]n an equal amount of land it is
proposed to increase the price to double the usual Government price.”
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Walker condemned this increase in the price of certain federal lands as “a
tax upon the actual settlers to that amount in order to build the road.”171
Illinoisans would be burdened by the act’s required price increase, a
requirement that prompted Walker to question Congress’s motives. “If the
Government is going to be generous, let it be generous; but let it not
speculate upon its own lands at the expense of those who are to settle upon
them,” he argued.172
For Walker and others, the act was problematic not because it
promoted internal improvements, or because it gave land to a state to be
used for a railroad, but rather because it amounted to a federally imposed
tax on settlers in that state who would pay double the pre-act amount to
purchase land within the zone of the railroad grant. As William Dawson
of Georgia put it, “[W]here is the power in this Government to make a
donation to A in a manner that presses B into paying double price? How
is it that A became a beneficiary under the Constitution, whilst you put a
penalty upon B?”173 These critics of the act were skeptical of arguments
offered by Douglas and others that the plan would promote the public
interest. They regarded it as an exploitation of the people of Illinois and a
potential source of “embarrassment” – in the nineteenth-century sense of
financial difficulty – for the state itself.
Other opponents of the ICR bill expressed discomfort with the
premise that Congress possessed the power to grant 1.5 million acres of
federal land to one state, even if Congress claimed that the benefits of the
railroad would redound to the entire nation. The chief concern of these
senators was therefore that it represented an improper use of the public
domain to enrich a single state – that is, that the act was creating excessive
restrictions on the federal government. If Congress was going to do
something with the public lands, they suggested, it had to be for the
benefit of “we the people” of the United States, not simply for Illinois.
Unlike the first group of critics, who argued that the ICR act imposed the
federal will on a state, these opponents of the act suggested that a single
state had captured the federal will and was using it selfishly, perhaps even
to the detriment of the other states. Their arguments thus sounded in the
local-national distinction that Jackson had used to justify his veto of the
Maysville Road bill. Instead of a beleaguered state populace suffering at
the hands of an overweening federal government, they saw Illinois and its
representatives as attempting to profit from Congress’s zeal for railroads.
Dawson put the point in the law French terms of trusts:
Can Congress give to Illinois under the cestui que trust, a
million and a half acres of land, and then turn round and
171
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173

Id.
Id.
Remarks of Senator Dawson, ICR Debates, supra note __, at 849.

38

tell the other States in the cestui que trust, we do it in order
to benefit the whole of you? The question is, have we any
such power? In my judgment, we have it not at all. The
public property belongs to the entire people, and when we
dispose of it we must dispose of it on that principle.174
The bill’s supporters responded to these criticisms by wrapping
themselves in the mantle of state sovereignty, while at the same time, and
somewhat paradoxically, dismissing the notion that the act subjected
Illinois to penalties, coercion, or excessive requirements. James Shields of
Illinois argued that “if the bill as it is will be any injury to Illinois, that
injury will be for the benefit of the people of the United States, and we
who represent Illinois are responsible to our people for that injury.”175 In
contrast to Shields’s effort to erect a barrier around the people and state of
Illinois, William Dayton of New Jersey took a more pragmatic view. “The
State of Illinois is not bound to go on and construct this road,” he stated.
“If you pass this act, she sees what she has before her, and accepts it or
does not accept it. There is no obligation incident to the passage of this
act that imposes any obligation on her.” 176 Dayton thus rejected the
implicit argument of many of the act’s opponents that the structure of the
land grant had any coercive force. The state could simply take it or leave
it, he argued.
Proponents of the program also characterized Congress as a
beneficent proprietor of the public lands, a trustee with a duty to use the
property for the benefit of the people. “I have never entertained the least
doubt that the Government, being the large landholder of our country, had
the right to dispose of, reserve, or improve the public domain,”
commented Henry S. Foote of Mississippi.177 Other advocates invoked
the appropriation-jurisdiction distinction that had so powerfully influenced
previous debates. Lewis Cass of Michigan insisted that there was “a
fundamental difference between the principle of this bill and the
Government carrying on a system of internal improvement.” Unlike the
internal improvements bills of the 1820s and 1830s, “[t]here is no
proposition in this bill that the Government should build the road; there is
no assumption of authority within the jurisdiction of the States for that
purpose whatever.” Moreover, Cass argued, echoing Dayton, the states
were not even bound by the act. “The jurisdiction is left entirely to the
States to do as they please; to make the road or leave the road unmade.”178
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Still others invoked the continental aspirations of the United States,
referring to the ICR as “a great national thoroughfare.”179
As the Senate debates demonstrate, the railroad land grants raised
many of the same themes as had the controversies over roads and canals a
few decades earlier. Throughout the ICR discussions, however, one
familiar concept proved particularly significant, even as participants
struggled to define it and determine its boundaries: the idea of state
consent. It was a particularly powerful idea for opponents of the ICR bill,
some of whom feared that the plan threatened the sovereignty of Illinois,
and others of whom found on the part of Illinois too much consent, even
eagerness, to take Congress’s bargain. As has been noted, the entire Ohio
congressional delegation supported the Cumberland Road bill in 1822, but
that did not amount to the relevant form or quantum of consent for
President Monroe.180 The chief loser (or winner, depending on one’s
perspective) from the ICR bill was Illinois, and the ardent support offered
by Douglas both aided and hindered the bill’s passage because
contemporaries identified the bill with the senator.181 But perhaps the
clearest, most concrete evidence of consent came in connection with the
bill’s proposal to link the ICR with Mobile, Alabama. After Douglas had
met with local representatives of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad and
decided to include Mississippi and Alabama in the draft bill, the
legislatures of both states instructed their counterparts in the U.S. House
and Senate to support the bill.182 Senator William R. King of Alabama
introduced the amendment extending the railroad to Mobile. Was all this
evidence of consent by Mississippi and Alabama to a physical invasion by
an instrumentality of the federal government? Or was it simply evidence
of classic nineteenth-century graft, in which the representatives of the
southern states came to view the economic and political benefits of the
railroad as outweighing their sovereignty concerns? For critics of the bill,
both of these were plausible explanations. Insufficient state consent gave
rise to fears of congressional overreach, while a surfeit of consent
suggested that the state was funneling away more than its share of benefits
from the Union and thus was not adhering to the rules of the federal
republic.
In the end, the ICR bill passed the House and Senate and was
signed into law by President Millard Fillmore on September 20, 1850. A
few months later, in February 1851, the Illinois Central Rail Road
Company received a charter from the Illinois legislature. 183 When
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construction of the railroad was completed in 1856, the right of way
crossed – and raised the value of – a section of property along the Chicago
lakefront that had previously been owned by Douglas.
III.

THE LOST HISTORY OF THE SPENDING POWER?

The debates over internal improvements legislation, from the
Bonus Bill in 1817 to the Illinois Central Railroad Act in 1850, suggest
two important insights for modern constitutional law.
First, the factors that the Supreme Court’s recent decisions have
treated as essential to analyzing a particular regulation’s congruence with
principles of federalism are not the same factors that early-nineteenthcentury commentators regarded as relevant. Second, the dramatic
difference between interbellum and millennial reasoning about federalism
challenges the Court’s reliance on a foundational distinction, unchanged
since the founding, between local and national activities. The history of
constitutional thought in the early nineteenth century demonstrates that
there is no single correct relationship between the general government and
the states, with all deviations to be explained away as political-branch
mistakes awaiting judicial correction. The internal improvements debates,
despite their untidy tacking from the appropriation-jurisdiction distinction
to states’ consent and back, were not simply one view of the Constitution.
Between the Revolution and the Civil War, they were the Constitution.
To understand why this is the case, consider the elements of
federalism. In interbellum Americans’ analysis of internal improvements,
as we have seen, the key factors were the consent of the states; the
distinction between Congress’s power to appropriate funds for internal
improvements and its power to implement and retain jurisdiction over
those projects; and widespread acceptance of the idea that the Constitution
could be amended to give Congress additional enumerated powers. In the
Court’s modern federalism analysis, however, these factors are largely
irrelevant.
The varying significance of state consent is best illustrated in the
Court’s 1992 decision in New York v. United States. In that case, a
majority of the Court invalidated a federal provision requiring states that
could not dispose of their own hazardous waste by a certain date to take
title to the waste. The majority’s theory was that by requiring a state to
assume ownership of the waste, Congress would in effect be
“commandeering” the state treasury because it would be compelling the
state to subsidize private parties – here, the producers of hazardous waste,
who would be relieved of ownership and liability by the federal
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provision.184 “The take title provision offers state governments a ‘choice’
of either accepting ownership of waste or regulating according to the
instructions of Congress,” Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote for the
Court. “As we have seen, the Constitution does not empower Congress to
subject state governments to this type of instruction.”185 The fact that
New York had previously supported the regional waste compact
containing the take-title provision was of no moment to the Court. “The
constitutional authority of Congress cannot be expanded by the ‘consent’
of the governmental unit whose domain is thereby narrowed, whether that
unit is the Executive Branch or the States.”186 It was not possible for New
York to consent to what the Court regarded as a violation of New York’s
sovereignty. “The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States
for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political
entities,” O’Connor wrote. “To the contrary, the Constitution divides
authority between federal and state governments for the protection of
individuals.”187 In other words, state sovereignty requires that a state be
prohibited from waiving waive any portion of what the Court understands
to be its Tenth Amendment rights.188
Moreover, in the early nineteenth century, the project of fleshing
out precisely what federalism ought to look like in practice took place
primarily in the political branches, in contrast to the modern Court’s
suggestion that the judiciary is the best judge of what federalism requires.
This point is implicit in New York v. United States, and it became explicit
in the health care case, with the Roberts Court’s revival of the coercion
inquiry in the context of the spending power analysis.189 Although one
might plausibly think that the coercion analysis is simply a modern
version of the early-nineteenth-century consent inquiry, the Chief Justice’s
opinion makes clear that the opposite of coercion is not consent by the
state, but rather the Court’s assessment that a particular spending program
184
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does not amount to “economic dragooning that leaves the State with no
real option but to acquiesce.”190
To be sure, as NFIB demonstrates, modern federalism doctrine
does view the states as having the power to consent to the “bargains”
offered by congressional conditional spending programs. Indeed, the fact
that the Medicaid provision of the ACA threatened to strip states of preACA Medicaid funds proved dispositive to the majority’s determination
that the program was not the type of “relatively mild encouragement”
typically associated with conditional spending programs, but instead
represented “a gun to the head.”191 In the majority’s view, the problem
with the Medicaid provision was precisely that it did not offer the states an
opportunity to consent to a deal that might have culminated in the loss of
their entire federal Medicaid funding.
But to the extent that notions of consent underpinned the Medicaid
portion of the NFIB decision, we must distinguish between consent in the
context of the conditional spending workaround on one hand, and in the
context of direct congressional regulation under Article I on the other hand.
As modern federalism cases such as New York v. U.S., Printz v. U.S., and
even Garcia v. SAMTA – and, of course, the portion of the NFIB decision
that rejected the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause
justifications for the individual mandate – demonstrate, state consent can
no longer be used a defense for Congress against the charge that its
regulation violates the Tenth Amendment. But this was not the case in the
early nineteenth century. On the contrary: as the internal improvements
debates demonstrate, the presence or absence of state consent was a vital
ingredient in the interbellum assessment of congressional regulation under
Article I.
Similarly, the early-nineteenth-century distinction between
appropriations and implementation, and especially the belief that
appropriations were constitutionally less problematic, has no real analogue
in modern doctrine. Consider Madison’s array of proposed amendments
in his correspondence with Van Buren. His second proposal, to grant
Congress the power to make appropriations that it would then turn over to
the states for them to apply to road and canal projects,192 would raise red
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flags today.193 To the extent that it permitted Congress to order state
legislatures to build roads and canals, the proposal would run afoul of the
Tenth Amendment’s anticommandeering principle. 194 Moreover, the
proposal would be difficult to justify as an exercise of the conditional
spending power. Although Congress typically has more latitude to affect
state policy through a conditional spending program than through direct
regulation, the lack of a condition in Madison’s scheme would foreclose
that avenue.
A different set of modern objections could be levied against
Madison’s third proposal, which suggested granting Congress the power
both to appropriate funds for, and to implement, internal improvements
projects.195 To be sure, such an approach would be less likely to run afoul
of the Tenth Amendment insofar as it does not involve Congress using the
states to carry out a federal program. On the contrary: state governments
would be excluded from internal improvements projects, which would be
carried out by federal officials. (Recall the Cumberland Road toll
collectors.) But other modern doctrinal concerns concerning direct
congressional regulation would then become relevant. For instance, some
of the internal improvements projects – for instance, a short stretch of road
within a single state, such as the Maysville Road – would arguably be
purely local in nature, with only remote effects on national markets. Such
a situation would trigger the intuition underpinning the majority’s holding
in the health care case that the individual mandate is beyond the scope of
the commerce and necessary and proper powers.196
As these examples demonstrate, the fundamental constitutional
relationship between Congress and the states, which is most clearly
observed through the device of the spending power, has undergone
profound change since the early nineteenth century. Constitutional
interpretations that emerged in the course of conflict between members of
Congress, and between Congress and the president, are largely absent
from modern doctrine. To be sure, doctrine changes over time, and one
cannot reasonably expect the same arguments to be made over the course
of two centuries’ worth of caselaw. But the great silence surrounding the
early nineteenth century in modern doctrine is notable given the posture of
the Court in recent decades. In the area of the spending power, as in the
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Tenth Amendment, the Court has frequently taken the position that the
basic conditions of the federal-state relation have not changed, and indeed
could not have changed, since the founding era. Chief Justice Roberts’s
opinion in the health care case exemplified this approach: “The Framers
gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to compel it, and for
over 200 years both our decisions and Congress’s actions have reflected
this understanding.”197
What are modern constitutional lawyers to make of the internal
improvements debates? One answer is that the debates tell us that we
should listen to James Madison in order to understand that sometimes
listening to James Madison would amount to good historical work but bad
lawyering. This is so not because Madison was wrong in some
fundamental sense about the best way of implementing the Constitution’s
scheme of federalism, or because lawyers should not pay attention to
history, or because old constitutional ideas are inherently suspect. But
neither are old constitutional ideas inherently correct, especially when
layers of old constitutional ideas must be sifted through and evaluated.198
Rather, the point is that the Constitution of the early nineteenth century
was not the Constitution of the twenty-first century, even with respect to
provisions of the text that remained the same throughout that time.
Indeed, even in the period from 1817 to 1850, the universe of
constitutional possibility shifted. As the railroad debates demonstrate, by
1850 discussions of internal improvements were no longer focused on
finding the right language for a constitutional amendment that most parties
agreed would solve the problem. Instead of ambitious proposals to give
Congress additional enumerated powers, Douglas and other supporters of
land grants to the states framed their arguments in more conservative
terms that worked with the constitutional text as it stood.199 From the
1810s to the 1830s, presidents and members of Congress believed that
they were living in an extension of the original constitutional moment, and
therefore assumed that the Constitution was still open to relatively easy
amendment. By 1850, however, that moment had ended. Consequently,
supporters of internal improvements turned to workarounds that fit with
their sense of the constitutionally permissible options. These workarounds,
such as the railroad land grants, in turn became part of the interbellum
Constitution.
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CONCLUSION.
Land grants to railroads did in some sense solve the problem of
internal improvements that had dogged American law and politics since
the founding. Applying the modern taxonomy of types of congressional
regulation, the land grants look more like a conditional spending program
than direct federal regulation under the commerce power or the necessary
and proper power. We can therefore say that direct regulation, and with it
the growth of congressional power, appeared more suspect to earlynineteenth-century Americans than did conditional spending programs that
relied on the states to carry out specific projects.
The modern concern with Congress’s ability to commandeer the
states, and the resulting imperative for the Court to protect the states, thus
did not have the resonance in the early nineteenth century that it has today.
The interbellum worry about direct congressional implementation of
internal improvements did not apply if the regulation was rooted in an
enumerated power, and many members of Congress and several presidents
were willing to expand that list of powers through the process of
constitutional amendment. Analogies to modern doctrine, then, are
tempting but ultimately difficult to make. Yet it is precisely this
disanalogy between the early-nineteenth-century constitutional landscape
and our own that offers valuable lessons for modern constitutional law.
Even when modern doctrine can be analogized to arguments and debates
from the long founding period, the reasoning behind those preferences is
not the same from their period to ours. Constitutional workarounds
flourish and change over time. Understanding the doctrinal history that
created and was created by the workarounds provides a vital window into
the universe of constitutional possibility at a specific time – and a
cautionary tale for static or originalist arguments about the nature of
American federalism.
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